

The Kemalist Republic by Bernard Lewis

'The basis of liberty, equality, and justice is the sovereignty of the nation. Sovereignty should not be built on fear. Sovereignty that rests on guns cannot endure. Such a sovereignty, or dictatorship, must only be a temporary expedient in a time of upheaval.'
MUSTAFA KEMAL, 1930

'Revolutions are inevitable in the lifetime of nations. They may result in despotism, but they also launch nations on paths previously blocked to them.'
MILOVAN DJILAS, *'The New Class'*, 1957.

At the end of 1918 it seemed that the Sick Man of Europe was about to die at last. Resentment against the dictatorship of the Young Turk leaders had been mounting for some time; the advance of the Allied armies lent it a force that could no longer be resisted. In July a new Sultan, Mehmed Vahideddin, a younger brother of Abdulhamid, had succeeded to the throne of Osman. In October the Young Turk ministers resigned, and the Sultan appointed Ahmed Izzet Paşa as Grand Vezir, with the task of seeking an armistice.

After three days of preliminary negotiation, on 29 October a Turkish delegation led by the Minister of the Navy Rauf Bey went on board H.M.S. *Agamemnon*, at anchor off Mudros, in the island of Lemnos, and signed an armistice next day. The Young Turk pashas, Talat, Enver, and Cemal, fled across the Black Sea on a German gunboat. An allied fleet of sixty ships sailed past the silent guns of the Dardanelles, and on 13 November anchored in the port of Istanbul.

General Izzet Paşa's tenure of office lasted only twenty-five days. Having achieved the armistice for which he was appointed, he gave place to Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, a former Grand Vezir and ambassador in London who would, it was hoped, be able to win the goodwill of the British. In the meantime, on 8 December, an Allied military administration was set up in Istanbul. Allied troops occupied various quarters of the city, strict Allied control was established over the port, tramways, defences, gendarmerie, and police, and on 8 February 1919 the French General Franchet d'Espérey, like Mehmed the Conqueror centuries before, rode into the city on a white horse, the gift of the local Greeks. The Arab provinces of the Empire were already in Allied possession, and had been promised independence. Allied forces now began to threaten even the Turkish provinces themselves. French troops advanced from Syria into Cilicia and the Adana district. British forces occupied the Dardanelles, Samsun, Ayntab, and other strategic points, as well as the whole length of the Anatolian railway. On 29 April 1919 Italian troops landed at Antalya, to take possession of some of the areas assigned to them by the secret wartime agreements of the Allies.

In Istanbul the new Sultan showed a disposition to follow in the footsteps of his elder brother and take over personal control of affairs. The Committee of Union and Progress had collapsed; its leaders had fled abroad. On 21 December the Sultan dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, and on 4 March 1919 appointed his brother-in-law Damad Ferid Paşa as Grand Vezir. Except for an interval of six months, from October 1919 to March 1920, Damad Ferid Paşa

remained in power until October 1920, when Ahmed Tevfik Paşa returned to the Sublime Court to hold office for just over two years, as the last Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire.

One of the first tasks of the Sultan and his ministers was to crush the remnants of the Young Turks. On 26 November court martial proceedings were opened against Enver and Cemal Paşas, *in absentia*. On 1 January 1919 they were dismissed from the army, and at the end of the month a new series of arrests and prosecutions began against the former leaders and supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress. Among the new leaders in the capital even the will to independent survival seemed to have failed and political discussion centres on the form which Turkish subjection was to take, and on the relative merits of an American or a British mandate.

There was indeed little room for hope. Exhausted by eight years of almost continuous warfare, the once great Ottoman Empire lay supine in defeat, its capital occupied, its leaders in flight. The country was shattered, impoverished, depopulated, and demoralized. The Turkish people, beaten and dispirited, seemed ready to accept almost anything that the victors chose to impose on them.

Almost, but not quite - for when, under cover of Allied warships, a Greek army landed at Izmir in May 1919, the smouldering anger of the Turks was at last kindled into an inextinguishable blaze. The cession of remote provinces inhabited by alien peoples could be borne, even the occupation of the capital could be suffered, for the occupiers were the victorious great powers of the invincible West, and their soldiers would sooner or later return whence they came. But the thrust of a neighbouring and former subject people into the heart of Turkish Anatolia was a danger –and a humiliation – beyond endurance.

The city and district of Izmir contained an important Greek population, and already in February 1919 Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, had presented a formal claim to them at the Peace Conference in Paris. The Italians, too, had a claim to Izmir, based on the superseded agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, and it was largely in order to forestall the Italians that the Allies agreed to a Greek landing. On 15 May 1919, protected by British, French, and American warships, a Greek army landed at Izmir; after systematically occupying the town and surrounding district, they began to advance eastwards into the interior.

The Greeks made it clear from the first that they had come, not for a temporary occupation, but for a permanent annexation – to incorporate western Anatolia in a greater Greece on both shores of the Aegean, and thus bring nearer the ‘Great Idea’ – the restoration of the departed glories of the Greek Christian Empire of Constantinople.

The ultimate menace of the Byzantine ‘Great Idea’ to the Ottoman Turkish state was clear enough to those who could see; the immediate blow of the Greek occupation to the Turkish people was felt in all the areas that they occupied. The Turkish reaction was violent and instantaneous. In Istanbul, under the guns of the occupying armies, there were great protest meetings, and the first beginnings of a secret resistance movement. On 23 May a vast, mass demonstration was held in the Sultan Ahmed Square. In Anatolia, the first armed clash occurred on 28 May at Ödemiş, where a small body of Turks fought unsuccessfully to halt the Greek

forces, and guerrilla warfare flared up along the line of Greek advance. The Turks were ready to rise against the invader – only the leader was awaited.

Mustafa Kemal

On 19 May 1919, four days after the Greek landing at Izmir, Mustafa Kemal Paşa landed at Samsun, on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia, with orders from Istanbul to supervise the disbanding of the remaining Turkish forces. Instead, he set to work at once on the double task of organizing a movement and raising an army.

Mustafa, later known as Kemal Atatürk, was born in Salonika in 1881, in a modest home. His grandfather had been an elementary school-teacher in Salonika; his father was a minor official who later became a timber merchant. Orphaned at the age of seven, Mustafa was brought up by his mother Zübeyde Hanim. In 1893, against her wishes, he entered the military *rüşdiye* school in Salonika; it was there that, in accordance with a common Turkish custom, he was given a second name by his teacher, and thus became Mustafa Kemal. In 1895 he went on to the military academy (*idadi*) in Manastir, and on 13 March 1899 entered the War College (*Harbiye*) in Istanbul as an infantry cadet. In 1902 he was assigned to a staff course, and in January 1905 graduated with the rank of staff-captain.

Mustafa Kemal's years at the War College coincided with some of the harshest repressions of Abdülhamid – and the College was one of the main centres of secret opposition. Despite all disciplinary measures, the cadets read the works of Namik Kemal and the Young Turk exiles secretly in their dormitories, and exchanged opinions on the ills of their country and the means of remedying them. Speaking of his years as a cadet, Mustafa Kemal later remarked:

‘ I worked well at the usual lessons. On top of this, new ideas emerged among some of my companions and myself. We began to discover that there were evils in the administration and politics of the country, and we felt the urge to communicate this discovery to the thousands of students of the College. We founded a handwritten newspaper for them to read. We had a small organization in the class. I was in the committee, and I used to write most of what appeared in the paper.’

Inevitably, the apprentice conspirators were denounced and arrested. After a few months' detention Mustafa Kemal was released and given orders – to join the staff of the Fifth Army in Damascus. It was then that he had his first taste of active service, against Druze rebels. In 1906, together with a few friends, he founded a secret opposition group, and may have had some part in the Young Turk movement in Salonika. In 1907 he was promoted Major and posted to the Third Army in Macedonia. Then he got in touch with the secret Committee of Union and Progress, and took part in their work. His relations with the Young Turk leaders do not, however, seem to have been very cordial, and the revolution of 1908 did not bring him greatly to the fore. After the revolution he abandoned politics for a while, and devoted himself to his military career, publishing translations of General Litzmann's manuals on platoon combat drill (1909) and company combat drill (1910). In 1910 he went on his first visit to Europe, to attend the great French military manoeuvres of that year in Picardy. In the Italian and Balkan wars he served with distinction on several fronts, and during the uneasy peace that followed was posted to Sofia

as military attaché. At the beginning of 1915, at his own urgent request, he was recalled to Turkey to take part in the war, and was given the command of the 'almost imaginary' 19th Division, then in process of formation at Tekirdag, on the European shore of the Sea of Marmara. From there he and his division went to the Gallipoli peninsula, where he played a vital role in the successful defence of the Straits against the great British assault in 1915. This victory, which saved the capital from invasion, was one of the few major successes won by Ottoman arms during the war. To Mustafa Kemal it brought promotion, fame – and a posting to the remote eastern battlefield, many hundreds of miles from Istanbul, where a victorious national hero might be disagreeably conspicuous.

On 27 February 1916 he assumed a command at Diyarbakir, with the rank of general. A swift campaign against the Russians enabled him to recover Bitlis and Mus for Turkey (7-8 August 1916), and to win new honours for himself.

After further service in Syria and the Caucasus, he was on 5 July 1917 appointed to the command of the newly constituted Turkish Seventh Army, forming part of the so-called 'Yildirim Army Group' under the German General Falkenhayn, in Syria. Disagreements with Falkenhayn led to his resignation and return to Istanbul in October 1917. Two visits to Europe followed, the first to Germany with the heir-apparent Mehmed Vahideddin, the second to Austria for medical treatment. In July 1918, still weak from illness, he returned to Istanbul, and on 7 August resumed command of the Seventh Army in Palestine. Six weeks later, on 17 September, Allenby began his final offensive north of Jerusalem, and the Turkish and German forces were driven out of Palestine and Syria. It was while Mustafa Kemal was preparing a last desperate struggle north of Aleppo that he heard of the signature of the armistice at Mudros. The next day, on 31 October, he was appointed commander of the Yildirim Army Group, in succession to Liman von Sanders. Two weeks later his Army Group was dissolved and he himself summoned to the capital. He reached Istanbul on 13 November – the day of the arrival of the Allied fleets.

Despite his prestige as the only remaining victorious general in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal was not able to do very much in Istanbul. The Sultan and his friends were strongly opposed to all nationalist ideologies, which they held responsible for the misfortunes that had befallen the Empire; they were therefore anxious to discourage any popular movement of revolt which might, they felt, threaten the existing order as much as it threatened the invader. And so they continued the disarming of the Turkish forces, accepted successive Allied violations of the Armistice terms, ordered the Turkish troops in Izmir to offer no resistance to the Greeks, and suppressed any tendency to oppose or resist in the city. In the opening phrases of his historic speech on the revolution delivered in 1927, Mustafa Kemal described the situation with characteristic vigour:

‘Those who had dragged the nation and the country into the Great War had thought only of saving their own lives and had fled abroad. Vahideddin, who occupied the position of Sultan and Caliph, was a degenerate who, by infamous means, sought only to guard his own person and throne. The cabinet, headed by Damad Ferid Paşa, was weak, cowardly, and without dignity, subservient to the will of the Sultan, and ready to agree to anything that might protect him as well as their own persons.’

Realizing the hopeless condition of the capital, Mustafa Kemal decided to go to Anatolia, where some signs of revival were already noticeable. In December 1918 the first resistance groups had been formed, the so-called 'Societies for the Defence of Rights' (*Mudafaai Hukuk*). The first to appear were in Thrace and Izmir; others followed in Manisa and elsewhere in Anatolia, and set the pattern for national resistance movements in areas menaced or occupied by the enemy.

The problem of how to leave the occupied capital and reach Anatolia proved unexpectedly simple. The Sultan, unaware of his intentions, was induced to give him an appointment as Inspector General of the Ninth Army (in June 1919 renumbered Third Army), based on Samsun, on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia. His instructions were to restore order, to settle Muslim-Christian disturbances, to disarm and disperse the semi-military bands that had been operating in the area, and in general to supervise the disarmament and demobilization of the remaining Ottoman forces. Instead he set to work to establish links between existing resistance groups, to form new ones, and to prepare for the armed defence of the Turkish heartlands against invasion.

Meanwhile, in the West, the victorious Allies were at last completing their arrangements for the disposal of the Sick Man's worldly goods. After a series of conferences in London and San Remo, a treaty was drawn up, and was signed by the representatives of the Allies and of the Sultan at Sèvres on 10 August 1920.

The treaty of Sèvres was very harsh, and would have left Turkey helpless and mutilated, a shadow state living on the sufferance of the powers and peoples who were annexing her richest provinces. It was far more severe than that imposed on a defeated Germany, and was received in Turkey with a national day of mourning.

It was, however, never implemented. While the Allies were imposing their terms on the docile government of the Sultan, a new Turkish state was emerging in Anatolia, led by men who rejected outright the treaty and the principles that underlay it, and condemned as traitors those Turks who had accepted it.

From the moment of his landing at Samsun, Mustafa Kemal had been hard at work in Anatolia, organizing the cadres of a national army, and preparing the ground for a war of liberation. In June he had a secret meeting in Amasya with Ali Fuad Paşa [Cebesoy], Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], and Colonel Refet [Bele], and communicated with General Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, commanding the 15th Army Corps at Erzurum. Soon afterwards he sent a circular telegram, in cypher, to a number of civil and military authorities in the country, setting forth his views. The opening phrases strike the keynote of the nationalist programme during the next few years:

1. The integrity of the country, the independence of the nation are in danger.
2. The central government is unable to discharge the duties for which it is responsible. As a result the nation is regarded as non-existent.
3. Only the will and resolution of the nation can save the independence of the nation.'

The telegram then goes on to demand the convening of a congress, free from any influence or interference, to assert the rights of the nation before the world, and calls on each district to send delegates, in secret, to Sivas 'which is the safest place in Anatolia for that purpose'. At the same time Kazim Karabekir sent out invitations for a meeting of delegates from the eastern provinces in Erzurum in July.

News of Mustafa Kemal's activities reached Istanbul, bringing joy to some quarters and alarm to others. The Minister of War called on him to return to Istanbul, and, when he omitted to do so, obtained an irade from the Sultan terminating his appointment. Mustafa Kemal, anxious to avoid any open act of rebellion against the legitimate Ottoman government, resigned his commission and put on civilian clothes. He now turned to the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia, founded in Erzurum on 3 March 1919; this society, later registered in proper legal form at the vilayet of Erzurum, provided both an element of legal continuity and an instrument of organization.

On 23 July 1919 a congress of delegates from the eastern provinces, convened by the Association, assembled in Erzurum. Mustafa Kemal was elected chairman on the first day. The most important achievement of the congress, which continued until 7 August, was the drafting of the first version of the declaration which later came to be known as the National Pact (*Millî Misak*). During the congress Kazim Karabekir received orders from Istanbul to arrest Kemal and Rauf, and to take over Kemal's post as Inspector-General. He refused to obey.

On 4 September the second and more important congress opened at Sivas, attended by delegates from all over the country. Once again Mustafa Kemal was elected chairman, and directed the discussions of the meeting. The main business of the congress was to extend to the whole country the decisions taken at Erzurum, and to modify the organization established there accordingly. The 'Association for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia' now became the 'Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia', with a permanent Representative Committee headed by Mustafa Kemal, and this new organization became the instrument of the political struggle ahead.

The political aims expressed at the Sivas congress were neither clear nor united. The delegates began by taking an oath never to revive the Committee of Union and Progress, and sending an address to the Sultan; they then went on to consider whether they should concern themselves with politics or not, and were by no means unanimous in agreeing to do so. Even there, the idea of an American mandate, popular in some circles in Istanbul, was raised by some delegates, only to be rejected by the great majority. The congress instead reaffirmed the principles of the Erzurum manifesto, and indeed strengthened the wording at some points, demanding the preservation of territorial integrity and national independence, and envisaging armed action against the occupying powers if necessary.

The congress lost no opportunity of reaffirming its loyalty to the Sultan, laying the blame on the Grand Vezir and the cabinet. On 10 September Mustafa Kemal telegraphed to Adil Bey, the Minister of the Interior:

‘You are preventing the nation from submitting their case to their sovereign. Cowards, criminals! You are engaged in treasonable conspiracies with the enemy against the nation. I did not doubt that you would be incapable of appreciating the strength and will of the nation; but I did not want to believe that you would act in this traitorous and murderous way against the fatherland and the nation. Think what you are doing. ...’

The next day a telegram was sent to the Sultan from the army commanders, reaffirming their loyalty to the throne and the sovereign, and begging him to 'deign to order the formation of a new government, loyal and respectful of the privileges of Your Majesty and of the Caliphate'. Another telegram, signed by the General Assembly of the Congress', was sent to the Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Paşa, accusing him both of trampling on the rights of the nation and of outraging the dignity and honour of the Sultanate.

The nation has no confidence left in any of you other than the Sultan, to whose person alone therefore it must submit its reports and petitions. Your cabinet ...is coming between the nation and the sovereign. If you persist in this obstinacy for one hour longer, the nation will consider itself free to take whatever action it thinks fit, and will break off all relations between your illegal cabinet and the whole country. This is our last warning. ...’

The immediate cause of these outbursts was the attempt by the Istanbul government, with some British help, to stir up the Kurdish tribes in the east against Kemal. These efforts had little effect, and precipitated the rupture between the Kemalists and Istanbul.

At first, however, relations with the capital showed signs of improvement. On 1 October Damad Ferid Paşa resigned, and was replaced by Ali Rıza Paşa, who, if not in favour of the Kemalists, was not actively opposed to them. He did go so far as to open negotiations, and on 2-21 October conversations were held at Amasya between Mustafa Kemal and a group of representatives of the Istanbul government led by the Minister of the Navy, Salih Paşa. Some measure of agreement was reached, involving the virtual recognition of the Kemalists by the government, and the acceptance by Istanbul of the main political principles of the Kemalist programme. In December 1919, as a result of nationalist persuasion and pressure, new elections were held for the Ottoman parliament, which assembled in Istanbul on 12 January 1920. The Kemalists and their sympathizers had won a majority, and among the new members were some from the nationalist camp in Anatolia, including Rauf Bey. A fortnight later Parliament voted the National Pact, based on the declarations of Erzurum and Sivas, and formulating the basic demands for territorial integrity and national independence.

Mustafa Kemal and the 'Representative Committee', now established in Ankara, seemed in a strong position, with a sympathetic parliament in Istanbul and some measure of recognition from the government. Nationalist sympathizers in the capital became more active, and helped the Kemalists not only with words, but also by raiding Allied arms depots and sending their booty to Anatolia. The Allies, alarmed at these developments, reacted sharply. On 3 March Ali Rıza Paşa was forced to resign, and was replaced on 8 March by his Minister of the Navy, Salih Paşa. The same day the Allied Supreme Council decided on a reinforced occupation of Istanbul. On 16 March British forces entered the Turkish quarters of the city of Istanbul, and General Wilson, the Allied Commander, ordered the arrest and deportation of Young Turk and other suspected

nationalist sympathizers. Some 150 were arrested in all, and a number of deputies, among them Rauf, deported to Malta. They were released late in 1921, in exchange for British officers arrested in Anatolia and held as hostages by the nationalists.

On 18 March 1920 the last Ottoman parliament in Istanbul held its last session. After unanimously voting a resolution of protest against the arrest of some of its members, it prorogued itself indefinitely. It did not meet again, and was finally dissolved by the Sultan on 11 April.

Matters now came rapidly to a head. On 19 March, the day after the prorogation of parliament in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal called for elections to a new emergency assembly. It was to meet in Ankara, where the 'Representative Committee' had established itself on 27 December 1919. This small Anatolian hill town now became the headquarters of the nationalist resistance—the virtual capital of Turkish independence.

On 23 April a body of delegates, known as the Grand National Assembly, met in Ankara. Even now, the delegates were very reluctant to take any steps that might be construed as rebellious, and tried desperately to maintain legal continuity. So long as it was possible to do so, the nationalists proclaimed their loyalty to Mehmed Vahideddin, Sultan of the Empire and Caliph of Islam, and reaffirmed their desire to rescue him from enemy hands.

It soon ceased to be possible. On 5 April 1920 the Sultan had recalled Damad Ferid Paşa to the Grand Vezirate, and opened a new and bitter attack on the nationalists. On 11 April the *Şeyh-ül-Islâm* Dürrizade Abdullah Efendi issued a *fetva* declaring that the killing of rebels, on the orders of the Caliph, was a religious duty; the Grand Vezir published a proclamation denouncing 'the false representatives of the nation'; the Circassian Anzavur, who had been fighting against the nationalists since September, was given the title of pasha. On 18 April 'Disciplinary Forces' (*Kuvva-i Inzibatiye*) were formed to fight the nationalists, and on 11 May Mustafa Kemal and other nationalist leaders were solemnly sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by a court martial in Istanbul. The Sultan and his government were preparing to use all weapons – religious, political, military – in their last desperate assault on the new power rising in Anatolia.

The nationalists replied in kind. On 3-4 May the Grand National Assembly appointed a council of ministers. On 5 May the Mufti of Ankara, Börekçizade Mehmed Rifat Efendi, issued a *fetva*, endorsed by 152 other Muftis in Anatolia, declaring that a *fetva* issued under foreign duress was invalid, and calling on the Muslims to 'liberate their Caliph from captivity'. On 19 May the Assembly declared Damad Ferid Paşa traitor.

These measures had, however, only limited effect in counteracting the immense prestige of such ancient and venerated offices as those of the Sultan, the Grand Vezir, and the *Şeyh-ül-Islâm*. Anti-nationalist riots broke out in many places, and irregular forces of various kinds, encouraged and sanctified by the authority of Istanbul, harried the nationalists even in the neighbourhood of Ankara.

The nationalists, already militarily engaged against the Greeks, the Armenians, and the French, were hard put to it to defend themselves against the 'Army of the Caliphate'. In late 1920

and in 1921, however, events took a turn in their favour. The signing of the treaty of Sèvres caused an immense revulsion of feeling in Turkey against the régime that had accepted it; the growing dissensions of the former allies made it possible for Kemal to strengthen his position by judicious separate negotiation. In Istanbul, on 17 October 1920, Damad Ferid Paşa, under strong Allied pressure, resigned for the last time and gave place to Tevfik Paşa. In Ankara, in January 1921, the ministers elected as chair- man Femi Pasha [Çakmak], who had resigned the Ottoman Ministry of War and joined the nationalists the previous April. The progress of the struggle against the Greeks identified the Ankara regime with the national cause, and made opposition to it, rather than support for it, seem like treason and impiety in Turkish eyes.

The Greco-Turkish war falls into three stages, corresponding roughly with the campaigns of 1920, 1921, and 1922. In the first, the Turks, hopelessly outmatched in numbers and material, were badly defeated, and Greek forces advanced in both Anatolia and Rumelia. The second Greek campaign, in 1921, also opened well for the invaders, who made several important gains. The Turks, however, rallied. On 10 January a Turkish force under Colonel Ismet halted the Greeks in a valley near İnönü. In a second, more important battle, fought at İnönü on 31 March-1 April, Ismet, now promoted Brigadier, again repelled the invaders. It was from this engagement that Ismet İnönü, the collaborator and successor of Mustafa Kemal, later took his surname.

A new Greek advance began in July, and continued until the Greeks met the Turks on the Sakarya river. Then, on 24 August, a great battle took place, and the Turkish forces, under the personal command of Mustafa Kemal, won a decisive victory. The Greeks withdrew to a new line farther west. The victorious general was greeted by the Grand National Assembly with the title of 'Gazi' – victor in the holy war.

The effects of the victory by the Sakarya were considerable. The nationalists were now internationally recognized as a powerful factor; by some as the real government of Turkey. The Soviets had already signed an agreement with them in March 1921, fixing the frontier and establishing friendly relations. The French now did the same. In October a new Franco-Turkish treaty was signed with the nationalists, drawing up a new Turco- Syrian frontier far more favourable to Turkey than that laid down in the treaty of Sèvres, and providing for the French evacuation of Cilicia. The Italians too withdrew from their zone in southern Anatolia, stipulating only the retention by them of the Dodecanese islands. These withdrawals and agreements greatly strengthened the military position of the nationalist forces, who now in addition began to acquire large quantities of arms.

While the Turks had been growing in strength, the Greeks were weakened by dissension and changes of régime and policy at home. In August 1922 the third and final phase of the war began. The Turks won a crushing victory at Dumlupınar and, driving the Greeks before them, reoccupied Izmir on 9 September, thus completing the reconquest of Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal now prepared to continue the struggle in European Turkey, and to drive the Greeks out of eastern Thrace. To do so, he had to cross the Dardanelles, still occupied by an inter-Allied force. The French and Italian contingents withdrew, but the British remained, and for a while an Anglo-Turkish clash seemed imminent. Finally, the British gave way to Kemal's

demands, and on 11 October, 1922 an armistice was signed at Mudanya. By its terms, the Allied governments agreed to a restoration of Turkish sovereignty in Istanbul, the Straits, and eastern Thrace, which was occupied at once by 8,000 Turkish gendarmes. Full Turkish reoccupation was delayed pending the signature of a peace treaty. The Greeks acceded to the armistice on 14 October; on the 19th Refet Paşa, with a special commission from the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, crossed by the S.S. *Gülrihal* from Mudanya and entered the city of Istanbul.

The Treaty of Lausanne

The peace conference opened at Lausanne on 20 November 1922. Many months of diplomatic wrangling followed, until the treaty was finally signed on 24 July 1923. Its chief significance for Turkey was the re-establishment of complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty in almost all the territory included in the present-day Turkish Republic. At the same time the Capitulations, long resented as a symbol of inferiority and subservience, were abolished. Thus Turkey, alone among the defeated powers of the First World War, succeeded in rising from her own ruins and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors, secured the acceptance of her own terms. For the treaty of Lausanne was substantially an international recognition of the demands formulated in the Turkish National Pact.

The military battle was won; the political programme of the nationalists had been achieved, and had been recognized by the world in an international treaty. What was to be done next? It was in his answer to this question that Mustafa Kemal showed his true greatness.

The point was well made by the Turkish journalist Falih Rifki Atay, in his comparison between Mustafa Kemal and the Young Turk leader, Enver Paşa:

'Enver's special quality was boldness, Mustafa Kemal's was insight. . . . Had Mustafa Kemal been Minister of War in 1914, he would not have pushed the country into the First World War; had Enver entered Izmir in 1922, with the same élan he would have turned back, marched on Syria and Iraq, and lost all that had been won'

There were indeed many distractions, which at that time might have enticed a warrior-hero. There were the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe and Asia, where the growing difficulties of the successor regimes might have favoured a reassertion of Turkish claims.⁶ Nearer to the heart of Turkish nationalists, there were the 20 odd million Turkish-speaking Muslims of the fallen Russian Empire, which in the throes of revolution, intervention, and civil war might have offered a tempting field for political adventure. But Kemal did none of these things. Once the war was over, he made peace with the Greeks, settling the ancient disputes between them by the brutal but effective method of an exchange of populations. He accepted the demilitarization of the Straits, to be ended only many years later and then by negotiation and agreement. Renouncing all foreign ambitions and all pan-Turkish, pan-ottoman, or pan-Islamic ideologies, he deliberately limited his actions and aspirations to the national territory of Turkey as defined by treaty, and devoted the rest of his life to the grim, laborious, and unglamorous task of reconstruction. In a speech in 1923 he warned the people of Turkey:

‘The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded as having achieved the real salvation of our country. These victories have only prepared the ground for our future victories. Let us not be puffed up with military victories. Let us rather prepare for new victories in science and economics.’

The Political Reform

The first problem to be settled was, however, political – the form and structure of the Turkish state. The nationalists had from the first insisted on their loyalty to the sovereign; his actions against them and against what they regarded as the national cause were attributed to evil advisers and foreign control, from both of which they proposed to rescue him. But at the same time they had also formulated and adopted certain political principles which, in the long run, would prove incompatible with the survival of the Sultanate. As early as July 1920 Mustafa Kemal declared to the National Assembly in Ankara, amid applause: 'I think that the fundamental reality of our present-day existence has demonstrated the general tendency of the nation, and that is populism and people's government. It means the passing of government into the hands of the people.' In August of the same year he made the same point again: '...Our point of view, which is populism, means that power, authority, sovereignty, administration should be given directly to the people, and should be kept in the hands of the people.' It was about this time that the Assembly, with obvious reluctance, began to discuss constitutional questions. On 20 January 1921 it passed a 'Law of Fundamental Organizations', which began with the uncompromising declaration that 'sovereignty belongs without reservation or condition to the nation; the system of administration rests on the principle that the people personally and effectively directs its own destinies'. The subsequent articles went on to establish the position of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara as 'the only real representative of the people, and as the holder of both legislative and executive power'.

With the Greeks and Allies at last out of the way, two forces remained, face to face, in Turkey; on the one hand a populist, nationalist government and Assembly, flushed with military victory and popular support; on the other the ancient supreme offices of the Muslim state and faith, still able to confer on their holders, however discredited by defeat and collaboration, an immense prestige and authority in the eyes of Muslim Turks of all classes.

The final clash between the two was precipitated by the Allied powers, who still insisted on recognizing the Sultan's government in Istanbul, and invited them as well as the nationalists to the peace conference at Lausanne. This twofold invitation and the prospect which it opened of divided Turkish authority at a crucial time, decided Kemal to terminate, once and for all, the political power of the throne.

The task was not easy. Kemal himself tells how he sounded some of his closest associates, and found them still loyal to the Sultanate. Rauf Bey, who had succeeded Fevzi as chief minister in July 1922, said:

‘I am bound by conscience and sentiment to the Sultanate and Caliphate. . . . It is my duty to remain loyal to the sovereign: my attachment to the Caliphate is imposed on me by my education. Besides this, I would make a general observation. It is hard for us to control

the general situation. This can only be secured by an authority that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachably high. Such is the office of Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and to try and set up an entity of a different character in its place, would lead to failure and disaster. It is quite inadmissible.'

Refet Paşa, who was sitting near-by, agreed, and added that 'in fact, there can be no question of any form of government other than the Sultanate and Caliphate'.

Mustafa Kemal had, however, reached his decision. The Sultanate and Caliphate were to be separated, and the former abolished. There would henceforth be no Sultan, but an Ottoman prince would hold office as Caliph only, with religious but not political powers. By this compromise Mustafa Kemal hoped to disarm the opposition of the religious elements to political change, to retain the advantages of a legitimate and revered authority above politics, and at the same time to end the personal autocracy of the Sultan.

On 31 October Kemal put his proposals to a meeting of the association for the Defence of Rights. The next day they were submitted to the Assembly, where they formed the subject of long and heated arguments. Strong opposition to the proposals at once appeared, and the members of the Assembly's committee on *Şeriat*, mostly men of religion, raised all kinds of legal and theological objections. Kemal, sitting in a corner of the crowded committee room, saw that nothing very satisfactory to him was likely to emerge from these debates. The rest of the story is best told in his own words:

'Finally, I asked the Chairman of the joint committee for permission to speak, and, jumping on the bench in front of me, I made this statement, in a loud voice: 'Gentlemen,' I said, 'Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because scholarship proves that they should be; or through discussion or debate. Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty and sultanate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. The question under discussion is not whether or not we should leave Sultanate and sovereignty to the nation. That is already an accomplished fact – the question is merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If those gathered here, the Assembly, and everyone else could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may roll in the process.'

“As regards the theological aspect of the matter, there is no need for alarm or anxiety on the part of the reverend gentlemen. Let me give you a scholarly explanation.”

Having said this, I went on to give a lengthy explanation. Thereupon one of the deputies for Ankara, Hoca Mustafa Efendi said: “I beg your pardon, sir, we were looking at the matter from another point of view. We have been enlightened by your explanations”

The question was settled in the mixed committee. The draft law was quickly drawn up, and read on the same day at the second sitting of the Assembly. On a proposal to take a nominal vote, I mounted the tribune and said: "There is no need for this. I believe that the Assembly will unanimously adopt the principles which will for ever preserve the independence of the country and nation!" Cries of "Vote!" were raised, and finally the chairman put it to the vote and announced that it had been unanimously accepted. Only one opposing voice was heard saying: "I am against it", but was drowned by cries of "Silence!"

In this way, gentlemen, the final obsequies of the decline and fall of the Ottoman Sultanate were completed.'

The resolution passed on 1 November 1922 contains two articles. The first declared that 'the Turkish people consider that the form of government in Istanbul resting on the sovereignty of an individual had ceased to exist on 16 March 1920 [i.e. two and a half years previously] and passed for ever into history'; the second recognized that the Caliphate belonged to the Ottoman house but laid down that the Caliphate rested on the Turkish state, and that the Assembly would choose as Caliph 'that member of the Ottoman house who was in learning and character most worthy and fitting'.

Mehmed V I Vahideddin did not wait for the Assembly's judgment of his learning and his character. On 17 November news was received that he had slipped out of the palace and boarded a British warship, on which he fled to Malta. Next day the Grand National Assembly in Ankara declared him deposed, and elected his cousin Abdülmeçid as Caliph.

Mustafa Kemal now prepared for the next stages of the political struggle. His first need was for a political instrument. The Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia had served well enough during the struggle for national liberation. It was not, however, adequate to the needs of a country enjoying peace and independence. Mustafa Kemal now set to work to transform it into a real political party. As early as 6 December 1922 he made his first announcement to the press about the formation of a new party, to be called the People's Party, and invited the educated classes of the country to communicate their views to him directly. In the new year he went on extensive journeys in Anatolia, and on 8 April 1923 published a manifesto with nine articles. These reiterate his views on popular sovereignty, representative government, and the abolition of the Sultanate, and then go on to sketch a number of necessary reforms, especially in fiscal and administrative matters. In his 1927 speech, Kemal remarked of this manifesto:

'This programme contained essentially all that we have accomplished and applied until today. There were, however, certain important and fundamental questions that were not included in the programme, such as the proclamation of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, the suppression of the Ministry of *Şeriat*, the closing of the *medreses* and *tekkes*, the introduction of the hat. . . . I did not think it right, by prematurely introducing these questions into the programme, to give the ignorant and the reactionary the opportunity to poison the whole nation. For I was quite sure that at the proper time these questions would be solved and the people would in the end be satisfied. . . .'

In spite of some complaints that the programme was brief and inadequate, it served as the starting-point of a new political development. On 16 April the Grand National Assembly, which in three years had grown from a rebel band to a national parliament, dissolved itself in preparation for new elections – the first real general election in years. The elections, held in June, returned a new chamber of 286 deputies, which opened its proceedings on 11 August 1923. Two days earlier, on 9 August, the inaugural congress of the People's Party began its deliberations, on the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. The Assembly elected Kemal as Head of State; Fethi [Okyar] replaced Rauf as Prime Minister.

The first major political act of the new Assembly was the ratification, on 23 August 1923, of the treaty of Lausanne, securing the international status of the new Turkey. At home, too, important consequences followed. On 2 October the last Allied contingents left Istanbul; on 6 October Turkish troops under the command of Sükrü Naili Paşa marched into the Imperial city. By a strange coincidence Damad Ferid Paşa died on the same day in Nice.

The Ankara government now faced a decision of fundamental importance. Its answer was not long delayed. On 9 October İsmet Paşa, at a meeting of the People's Party, moved a constitutional amendment, in the form 'Ankara is the seat of government of the Turkish state'. Four days later the Assembly formally decided on its adoption.

The decision meant a new breach with the past – a logical sequel to the abolition of the Sultanate. The Emperor had gone; the Imperial city was ill adapted to house the government of revolutionaries that had overthrown him. For nearly five centuries Istanbul had been the capital of an Islamic Empire; the pallid ghosts of a splendid past still flitted unhappily through the halls of the Saray and the Sublime Court. Turkish Istanbul, with its mosques and palaces, its divines and courtiers; Pera, the Levantine suburb, with its cosmopolitan merchant community of concessionaires and compradors – these were too intimately associated with the past, in fact and in the mind of the Turkish people, to provide a centre for the new Turkey that Kemal wanted to build. And so a new capital was chosen, symbolizing and accentuating the changes that were taking place. The new state was based not on a dynasty, an empire, or a faith, but on the Turkish nation – and its capital was in the heart of the Turkish homeland.

In the meantime Kemal had been preparing a still more radical change – the proclamation of the Republic. The abolition of the Sultanate and retention of a separate Caliphate had created a dangerous ambiguity in the headship of the state. There were many, in the Assembly and elsewhere, who saw in the Caliph the legitimate sovereign and head of state – a kind of constitutional monarch and, more especially, defender of the faith. Kemal, however, had other ideas. At the beginning of October reports began to circulate that he was going to proclaim a Republic, and they gave rise to impassioned opposition and discussion. At the end of October, after a series of carefully planned political manoeuvres, Kemal came to the Chamber and proposed certain constitutional amendments which, he said, would remove the ambiguities and confusions in their political system. The draft amendment, prepared the previous night, included the phrases

‘The form of government of the state of Turkey is a Republic . . . the President of Turkey is elected by the Grand National Assembly in plenary session from among its own

members. . . . The President of Turkey is the head of the state...and appoints the Prime Minister. ...

At 8.30 in the evening after hours of debate, the resolution was carried by 158 votes, with many abstentions but no dissentients. Fifteen minutes later, at 8.45, the deputies elected Mustafa Kemal as first President of the Republic. He appointed Ismet Paşa as his first Prime Minister. The news was published all over the country the same night, and greeted after midnight in all parts by a salute of 100 guns.

The Attack on the Theocracy

Among those who took part in the debate on the constitutional amendment was the distinguished historian Abdurrahman Seref, the last Imperial Ottoman Historiographer, the first president of the Turkish Historical Society, and, at that time, a deputy for Istanbul in the Grand National Assembly.

‘There is no point [he said] in enumerating all the different forms of government. ‘Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the people!’ Once you have said that, you can ask whoever you like, and they will tell you that it means a Republic. That is the name of the new-born child. It seems, however, that some people dislike this name. Let them – it will make no difference.’

Not all the Sultan's former subjects were able to view the march of events with the same historical realism. In many quarters the proclamation of the Republic was received with enthusiasm, as the beginning of a new era. In others, it brought shock and grief, and profound anxieties as to the future. What did it mean? Would it merely replace the autocracy of the Sultan by that of Mustafa Kemal? How would it affect the Caliphate, and, with it, Turkey's standing as the leader of the Islamic world?

‘No great intelligence is necessary [said an editorial in *Tanin*, on 11 November 1923] to understand that if we lose the Caliphate, the state of Turkey, with its five or ten million inhabitants, would lose all importance in the world of Islam, and in the eyes of European politics we would sink to the rank of a petty and insignificant state. ...The Caliphate was acquired by the Ottoman dynasty and its retention in Turkey thus assured for ever; deliberately to create a risk of losing it is an action totally incompatible with reason, loyalty, and national feeling.’

The question of the Caliphate aroused interest far beyond the borders of Turkey, and brought anxious inquiries, especially from India, about the intentions of the republican regime. These last provoked the sharp comment from Kemal that ‘those who had attacked the Caliphate were not strangers ...they were Muslim peoples, who fought against the Turks under the British flag at the Dardanelles, in Syria, and in Iraq.

The main objection to the Republic, on the part of its conservative opponents in Turkey, was that it endangered the links of the Turkish people both with their own Islamic and Imperial

past, and with the larger Muslim world of which they had for so long been the leaders. It was inevitable that the forces of tradition should rally around the person of the Caliph, the living symbol of their attachment to both. The Caliph Abdülmecid, by all accounts a mild and scholarly man, nevertheless lent himself to this role, and in January 1924 was subjected to a stinging reproof from the President of the Republic :

‘In his domestic establishment and more especially in his public appearances the Caliph seems to be following the path of his ancestors the Sultans. ...We cannot sacrifice the Republic of Turkey for the sake of courtesy or sophistry. The Caliph must know exactly who he is and what his office is, and must content himself with it. ...’

It was, it seems, the interest of Indian Muslims in the Caliphate that touched off the crisis which ended with its abolition. On 24 November 1923 three of the major Istanbul daily papers published the text of a letter to İsmet Paşa, signed by two distinguished Indian Muslim leaders, the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali. The two signatories pointed out that the separation of the Caliphate from the Sultanate had increased its significance for the Muslims in general, and begged the Turkish government to place the Caliphate 'on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish state unique strength and dignity.'

Mustafa Kemal agreed with his opponents in seeing in the Caliphate the link with the past and with Islam. It was precisely for that reason that he was determined to break it. Once again, the preparation was carefully planned. At the beginning of 1924 Mustafa Kemal went to İzmir, to preside over large-scale military manoeuvres, and stayed there for two months. With him were İsmet Paşa, the Prime Minister, Kâzım Paşa, the Minister of War, and Fevzi Paşa, the Chief of the General Staff. 'We were agreed on the need to abolish the Caliphate. At the same time we decided to suppress the Ministry of *Şeriat* and *Evkuf* and to unify public education.'

On 1 March 1924 Mustafa Kemal opened the new session of the Assembly. In his speech, he emphasized three main points: the safeguarding and stabilization of the Republic, the creation of a unified national system of education, and the need to 'cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for centuries.'

The meaning of this third point was clarified next day at a meeting of the People's Party group. The President's proposals were discussed, and agreement reached on a series of motions, which were read to the Grand National Assembly on 3 March. They provided for the deposition of the Caliph, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the banishment of all members of the Ottoman house from Turkish territory. The next morning at daybreak the unhappy Abdülmecid was packed into a car and driven to a railway station to board the Orient Express – not the main Sirkeci station, where his departure might have provoked demonstrations, but a small one outside the city. The last of the Caliphs had followed the last of the Sultans into exile.

In abolishing the Caliphate, Kemal was making his first open assault on the entrenched forces of Islamic orthodoxy. The traditional Islamic state was in theory and in the popular conception a theocracy, in which God was the sole legitimate source of both power and law, and

the sovereign His vice-gerent on earth. The faith was the official credo of the established political and social order. The same Holy Law, coming from the same source and administered through the same judicature, embraced civil, criminal, and constitutional as well as ritual and doctrinal rules. The sovereign was the supreme embodiment of the Holy Law, maintained by it, and maintaining it. The ulema were its authorized defenders and exponents.

Since the beginning of the Ottoman reforms, great inroads had been made into the power of the ulema, who had been forced by successive reformers to surrender large areas of jurisdiction in legal, social, and educational matters. They still retained, however, great power and greater influence. A large part of the educational facilities of the country were under their control; the laws relating to family and personal matters were still dominated by the code which they administered; since the disappearance of the Sultanate and all the other institutions of the old régime, they remained the only power in Turkish society with the cohesion, the organization, and the authority to be able to challenge the leadership of the new régime. More than once in the past, the ulema had delayed or frustrated the work of the reformers; Mustafa Kemal was determined that they should not hinder his revolution. The abolition of the Caliphate was a crushing blow to their whole hierarchic organization. It was accompanied by a series of others, abolishing the ancient office of *Şeyh-ül-Islâm* and the Ministry of *Şeriat*, closing the separate religious schools and colleges, and, a month later, abolishing the special *Şeriat* courts in which theologian-judges had administered the Holy Law. The new order was confirmed in the republican constitution, adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 20 April 1924, which affirmed the legislative authority of the Assembly and reserved the judicial function to independent courts acting 'in the name of the nation.'

Radical changes of this kind inevitably aroused active and widespread resentment. In addition, opposition to Kemal's personal ascendancy was growing among those who had been most closely associated with him in the early phases of the national struggle. In the capital, a number of Kemal's former supporters broke away and began to form an opposition group, called the 'Progressive Republican Party'. Its leaders included Rauf and Generals Ali Fuad and Refet, who had been with him at the secret meeting in Amasya in June 1919, as well as General Kazim Karabekir and other prominent civilian and military members of the nationalist old guard. On 21 November 1924 Mustafa Kemal appointed his old friend Fethi [Okyar], regarded as a liberal, as Prime Minister in place of Ismet.

Political insurrection in the party was one thing; armed insurrection was another, and when, in February 1925, a Kurdish revolt broke out in the eastern provinces, Kemal acted swiftly and vigorously. The leader of the rebels was Şeyh Said of Palu, the hereditary chief of the Nakşbendi dervishes. By the beginning of March the rebellion had spread to much of the south-east, and seemed to offer a serious threat to the republican régime. In Ankara the experiment in government by the President's loyal opposition was abandoned. On 3 March Fethi was dismissed and Ismet Paşa resumed the premiership, and on the following day a drastic 'Law for the Maintenance of Order' was rushed through the Assembly, giving extraordinary and, in effect, dictatorial powers to the government for two years. They were renewed again in 1927 and did not finally expire until March 1929. At the same time special 'independence tribunals' were set up, in the east and in Ankara, the former with summary powers of execution. On the report of the

tribunal in Ankara, the Progressive Republican Party was outlawed on 3 June. Fethi had meanwhile been appointed, on 11 March, as ambassador to France.

In the east swift military action crushed the rebellion; the 'independence tribunals' administered swift justice to the rebel leaders. Seyh Said was captured in April and sentenced to death, together with forty-six of his followers, by an 'independence tribunal' in Diyarbakir, on 29 June. The sentences were carried out next day.

The Kurdish rebellion had been led by dervish Seyhs, who had urged their followers to overthrow the godless Republic and restore the Caliph. Kemal now reacted against the dervishes, closing their convents, disbanding their associations, and banning their meetings, ceremonies, and special garb.

It was at this time, and in this context, that Kemal made the first of his great symbolic revolutions – those dramatic changes of outward forms which expressed, in a manner at once vivid and profound, the forcible transference of a whole nation from one civilization to another. To the Westerner, the enforced replacement of one form of headgear by another may seem comic or irritating, and in either case trivial; to the Muslim it was a matter of fundamental significance, expressing – and affecting – his relations with his neighbours and his ancestors, and his place in society and in history. Islam was a faith and a civilization, distinct from other faiths and civilizations, uniting the Muslim to other Muslims, and separating him both from his heathen forefathers and his infidel neighbours. Dress, and especially headgear, was the visible and outward token by which a Muslim indicated his allegiance to the community of Islam and his rejection of others. During the past century modernization and reform had made great inroads into Muslim exclusiveness in matters of dress, and had created a new social gulf between the Westernized and the un-Westernized – the former comprising the male and secular elements of the ruling *élite*, the latter the rest of the population. But even among the immaculately trousered and jacketed dandies of the capital, one badge of distinctness had remained – the fez. This headgear, introduced a bare century earlier and fiercely resisted as an infidel innovation, had been adopted and accepted by Muslims in Turkey and in many other countries, and had become the last symbol of Muslim identification. The rest of the Muslim's body might be Westernized, but his head remained Islamic – with the tall, red, challenging fez proclaiming at once his refusal to conform to the West and his readiness to abase his unimpeded brow before God.

Already in the Young Turk period there were some more consistent Westernisers who dismissed the possibility of a separate Islamic civilization, modern yet distinct. 'Civilization means European civilization', Abdullah Cevdet had written in 1911. Mustafa Kemal was entirely of the same opinion. Speaking to the Assembly in November 1924, after the laws against the theocracy had gone into force, he remarked: 'The Turkish nation has perceived with great joy that the obstacles which constantly, for centuries, had kept Turkey from joining the civilized nations marching forward on the path of progress, have been removed.' 'Uncivilised people', he said on another occasion, 'are doomed to remain under the feet of those who are civilised.' And civilisation meant the West, the modern world, of which Turkey must become in order to survive. 'The nation has finally decided to achieve, in the essence and in form, exactly and completely, the life and mean that contemporary civilization assures to all nations.'

The events of 1925 had shown that the forces of reaction were still powerfully entrenched, and able to offer serious resistance to the progress of Westernisation. The removal of the Caliphate had not sufficed; a further shock was necessary – a traumatic impact that would shake every man in the country into the realization that the old order had gone, and a new one come in its place. The fez was the last bastion of Muslim identification and separateness. The fez must go. In his speech of October 1927 Kemal explained his action in these terms:

‘Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on the heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilised world, and in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality as in other aspects, in no way diverges from civilised life.’

The operation was carried through with characteristic speed and efficiency. In the last week of August 1925, on a visit to Kastamonu and Inebolu, Mustafa Kemal launched the first attack on the fez and the traditional garments still worn in provincial Anatolia. In a series of speeches he ridiculed them as wasteful, uncomfortable, and, above all, barbarous – unworthy of a civilised people. Addressing a crowd in Inebolu on 28 August he said:

‘Gentlemen, the Turkish people who founded the Turkish republic are civilised; they are civilised in history and in reality. But I tell you as your own brother, as your friend, as your father, that the people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilised, must show and prove that they are civilised, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living. In a word, the truly civilised people of Turkey... must prove in fact that they are civilised and advanced persons also in their outward aspect. I must make these last words clear to you, so that the whole country and the world may easily understand what I mean. I shall put my explanations to you in the form of a question.

Is our dress national? (Cries of no!)

Is it civilised and international? (Cries of no, no!)

I agree with you. This grotesque mixture of styles is neither national nor international... My friends, there is no need to seek a revive the costume of Turan. A civilised, international dress is worthy and appropriate for our national, and we will wear it. Boots or shoes on our feet, trousers on our legs, shirt and tie, jacket and a waistcoat – and, of course, to complete these, a cover with a brim on our heads. I want to make this clear. This head-covering is called “hat”.’

The secret was out. Mustafa Kemal drove his point home two days later, in Kastamonu: ‘I see a man in the crowd in front of me [he said, pointing to a citizen]; he has a fez on his head, a green turban on the fez, a smock on his back, and on top of that a jacket like the one I am wearing. I can’t see the lower half. Now what kind of outfit is that? Would a civilised man put on this preposterous garb and go out to hold himself up to universal ridicule?’

On 2 September a group of new decrees directed against the theocracy included a ban on the wearing of religious vestments or insignia by persons not holding a recognized religious office, and an order to all civil servants to wear the costume ‘common to the civilised nations of the world’ – that is, the Western suit and hat. At first ordinary citizens were free to dress as they

leased, but on 25 November 1925 a new law required all men to wear hats, and made the wearing of a fez a criminal offense.

The reaction of Muslim conservatives to this revolution can best be seen in a declaration issued in March 1926, on behalf of the 'Islamic Religious Presidency of the Kingdom of Egypt', and signed by the Rector of the al-Azhar university and the Chief Mufti of Egypt.

'It is clear [they said] that a Muslim who seeks to resemble a non-Muslim by adopting the latter's distinctive form of dress, will also come to take the same way as he in his beliefs and actions. That is why he who wears the hat because of an inclination to the religion of another and a contempt for his own is an infidel, according to the unanimous opinion of the Muslims. He who wears the hat in order to resemble non-Muslims, if he also adopts some of the practices of their religion, such as entering a church, is an infidel; if he does not do this, he is still a sinner. ...Is it not folly to abandon one's own national way of dressing in order to adopt that of other people, when this desire for imitation can lead to the disappearance of our nationality, the annihilation of our own identity in theirs, which is the fate of the weak. ...'

Statements of this kind, for obvious reasons, are not found in Turkey, but there can be little doubt that the pronouncement of the Egyptian divines substantially expressed the views of the Turkish opponents of the reform. The Caliph had, after all, been a remote and semi-mythical figure; the hat law affected every Turk in his own person, and the response was correspondingly greater. There were new disturbances in the east, and ominous stirrings elsewhere. The emergency 'Law for the Maintenance of Order', passed in March 1925 to deal with the Kurdish rebellion, was still in force, and the government was able to impose and enforce its will through the armed forces and the 'independence tribunals'. As Kemal grimly remarked:

'We did it [i.e. the abolition of the fez] while the Law for the Maintenance of Order was still in force. Had it not been, we would have done it all the same, but it certainly is true that the existence of the law made it much easier for us. Indeed, the existence of the Law for the Maintenance of Order prevented the large-scale poisoning of the nation by certain reactionaries.

Together with the fez, Mustafa Kemal changed some other symbols. The Turkish finance (*maliye*) calendar, based on a combination of the Greek months with the *hijri* year, had been in increasing use in Ottoman administration since the late eighteenth century, and in 1917 had been adjusted to the Gregorian months, though still with a modified *hijri* year. On 26 December 1925 it was abolished, and the Gregorian calendar and era officially adopted. At the same time the twenty-four-hour 'international' clock was confirmed as the only legally valid method of measuring time.

Another, and more delicate matter, was that of female clothing. In his speech at Kastamonu on 30 August 1925, Mustafa Kemal had attacked the veil as well as the fez.

In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a towel or something like it over their heads to hide their faces, and who turn their backs or huddle themselves on the

ground when a man passes by. What are the meaning and sense of this behaviour? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is a spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at once.

Even the great reformer, buttressed as he was by the Law for the Maintenance of Order and the 'independence tribunals', did not venture to legislate against the veil. The unveiling of women, already accepted among the educated classes in the big towns, made only slow progress elsewhere. It was not until 1935 that a ban on the veil was proposed at a congress of the People's Party, and even then no action was taken.

The Law Reform

The 'outward aspect' of the Turkish people, or at least of its accessible male members, had been changed. There remained the more difficult task of transforming its 'family life and way of living' to accord with the 'common practice of civilized nations'. For this a radical reorganization of the entire legal system of the country was necessary.

The nineteenth-century reforms had already removed large areas of law from the domination of the *Şeriat* and the jurisdiction of its exponents. On 8 April 1924 Mustafa Kemal had gone still further, and had abolished the separate *Şeriat* courts. But even after all these changes, the *Şeriat* still remained in force in most fields of family and personal law, and was still administered by judges who, though they sat in secular courts, were still to a large extent, by training and outlook, doctors of the Holy Law.

Throughout the periods of the reforms, the exclusive competence of the *Şeriat* lawyers in matters of family and personal status had been left intact. Kemal was determined to end it. At the beginning of 1924 the Minister of Justice, Seyyid, proposed the restoration, in an improved form, of the liberal Family Law of 1917. Kemal, however, was not interested in a law based on the *Şeriat*, however much it had been liberalized and modernized by interpretative ingenuity.

I wish to declare categorically [he said, in a speech at Dumlupınar on 30 August] that the basis of civilization, the foundation of progress and power, are in family life. A bad family life leads inevitably to social, economic and political enfeeblement. The male and female elements constituting the family must be in full possession of their natural rights, and must be in a position to discharge their family obligations.'

A few days later, on 11 September 1924, a commission of twenty-six lawyers set to work on the task of adapting the Swiss civil code to Turkish needs. The completed code was voted by the Assembly on 17 February 1926, and entered into force on 4 October. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this change in the development of Turkey. There had been many previous legal reforms, under the *Tanzimat* and Young Turk régimes, and not a few of the prescriptions of the *Şeriat* had been tacitly dropped, chiefly in the fields of administrative, commercial, and criminal law. But this was the first time that a reformer had dared to invade the intimacies of family and religious life, the inviolate preserve of the doctors of the Holy Law – and to do so, not by stealth, but by head-on attack. The God-given *Şeriat* was repealed by the Assembly, and its rules declared null and void, superseded by the new Turkish civil code.

Polygamy, repudiation – all the ancient bars to the freedom and dignity of women – were abolished. In their place came civil marriage and divorce, with equal rights for both parties. Most shocking of all, to Muslim opinion, the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man became legally possible, and all adults were given the legal right to change their religion at will.

The voting of the Swiss civil code by the Turkish Assembly did not, of course, transform Turkey overnight into a Middle Eastern Switzerland. In the towns and in the villages near to the main roads and railway lines, the new laws of marriage, divorce, and inheritance were, in the main, enforced. In the countless villages that made up the rest of the country, the old ways survived. A marriage was usually registered with the civil authorities, to ensure legitimacy and legal inheritance. The 'legal' wife was then credited with the offspring of other wives, bound to their husbands by the bonds of religion and custom, though without the consecration of the secular state. Even though the law gave them new and extensive rights, there were few village women who dared – or cared – to assert them against their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Even in the provincial towns, though polygamy disappeared, the women of the un-Westernized classes for a long time enjoyed very little real improvement in their status.

The citadel had, however, been breached. The authority of the state, always so important in a Muslim country, was now unmistakably on the side of reform, and the defenders of tradition were forced into the difficult and unfamiliar role of clandestine resistance. Following on a series of other defeats, the ulema had been driven from their last stronghold of power and influence; the apparatus of the law and the coercive agencies of its enforcement were being used in a determined effort to break their power for ever. Mustafa Kemal's purposes were made clear in his speech at the opening of the new law school in Ankara, on 5 November 1925 :

‘Gentlemen, when I speak to you of legal foundations, of the laws required by our new needs, I am not merely referring to the dictum that 'every revolution must have its own special sanctions'. While restraining myself from useless recriminations, I must at the same time observe, with the deepest regret, how the efforts made by the Turkish nation for at least three centuries to profit from the means and benefits of modern civilization have been frustrated by such painful and grievous obstacles.

The negative and overwhelming force that has condemned our nation to decay, that has ultimately broken and defeated the men of initiative and drive whom our fecund nation has in no period failed to produce, is the law that has hitherto been in your hands, the law and its faithful followers. ...

Think of the Turkish victory of 1453, the capture of Istanbul, and its place in the course of world history. That same might and power, which in defiance of a whole world made Istanbul for ever the property of the Turkish community, was too weak to overcome the ill-omened resistance of the men of law and to receive in Turkey the printing press, which had been invented at about the same time. Three centuries of observation and hesitation were needed, of effort and energy expended for and against, before the old laws and their exponents would permit the entry of printing into our country. Do not think that I have chosen a remote and ancient period, incapable of resuscitation, to illustrate the old law and the old lawyers. If I were to start giving you examples of the difficulties caused

during our new revolutionary era, to me personally, by the old law and its exponents, I would run the risk of overburdening you. ...All these events show that the greatest and at the same time the most insidious enemies of the revolutionaries are rotten laws and their decrepit upholders. ...

It is our purpose to create completely new laws and thus to tear up the very foundations of the old legal system...'

The most important of these new laws was undoubtedly the civil code. At the same time committees of jurists worked on others too, borrowing and adapting various Western systems of law to Turkish needs. Within a few years Turkey had new codes of obligations, commerce, maritime law, criminal law, and civil and criminal procedure, and a new system of judicature to administer them.

Conspiracy and Repression

These reforms brought a renewal of activity by the opponents of the régime, who had been quiescent since the crushing of the Kurdish rebellion. On 15 June 1926, thanks to an informer, the police discovered a conspiracy in Izmir. Its leader was Ziya Hursid, a former deputy who had opposed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924; its purpose was to assassinate Mustafa Kemal by throwing a bomb into his car when he came to Izmir.

The conspirators were arrested, and on 16 June the Gazi entered Izmir unharmed. Two days later the 'independence tribunal', hastily transferred from Ankara, assembled in Izmir, and the Gazi issued a message to the nation, saying: 'One day I shall die, but the Republic will live on!'

The trial began on 20 June, in the Alhambra cinema in Izmir; the presiding judge was Ali [Çetinkaya], better known as Kel Ali, bald Ali – an old soldier, a deputy, and a veteran of the Kemalist cause from the beginning. On 13 July sentences of death were pronounced against the accused, and carried out next day. The 'independence tribunal' now returned to Ankara, and began a new trial on 1 August, of a new batch of prisoners. On 26 August sentence of death was pronounced against a number of the accused, and carried out the same day.

The 'Law for the Maintenance of Order' had given Kemal the legal authority to deal not only with the insurgents in the east but also with political opponents in Ankara, Istanbul, and elsewhere. After the Kurdish rebellion, the Progressive Republican Party was outlawed, and a strict control clamped down on the opposition press. The Izmir conspiracy provided the opportunity to deal with its leaders as well as other opposition figures. The 'independence tribunals' at Izmir and Ankara soon extended their inquiries far beyond the original conspiracy and conspirators, and, with scant concern for legal rules and procedure, embarked on what was, in effect, a prosecution of all the major political opponents of Mustafa Kemal. Some were acquitted – the four generals, Kâzım Karabekir, Refet, Ali Fuad, and Cafer Tayyar Paşas, all concerned in the proscribed Progressive Party, were too respected to be condemned, and were released, to the great and ominous satisfaction of the army and a good many civilians. Other prisoners were less fortunate. Among those executed were prominent survivors of the Young

Turk movement, such as the former Finance Minister, Cavid Bey, and even intimate associates of the Gazi during the war of independence, such as Colonel Arif. Rauf Bey, described as the arch plotter, had left for Europe before the plot was discovered, and was condemned *in absentia* to ten years' banishment.

By 1927 all opposition to the régime – military, religious, or political – had been silenced, and when elections were held in August and September 1927 for a third Assembly of the Turkish Republic, only one party, the Republican People's Party of Mustafa Kemal, was there to take part in them. It was after this election, from 15 to 20 October, that Mustafa Kemal delivered his famous speech to the Congress of the People's Party. Taking thirty-six hours to deliver, the speech contains the Gazi's description and justification of his proceedings from the moment when he landed at Samsun on 19 May 1919. It is still the classic account of the Kemalist Revolution.

Secularization: The Romanisation of The Script

The new session of the Assembly began unremarkably, with the re-election of Mustafa Kemal as President and the reappointment of Ismet as Prime Minister. Further projects were, however, in preparation, with the purpose of giving the Turkish state and people a more secular, more national, more modern-and less Islamic character.

The first step was little more than a formal ratification of the changes already accomplished. The second article of the 1924 constitution had begun with the words 'The religion of the Turkish state is Islam' – a formula retained, with appropriate modifications, since the first Ottoman constitution of 1876. On 5 April 1928 the People's Party resolved to delete this clause from the constitution, and five days later, on 10 April, the Assembly voted a law to that effect. At the same time three other clauses were amended to remove religious expressions and allusions.

The disestablishment of Islam was completed, and Turkey was now, legally and constitutionally, a lay state, secular and modern in her constitution, her laws, and her aspirations. But there remained one symbol, potent and universal, that bound her to the Orient and set her apart from the Western community of nations – the Arabic script. It was this final badge of Muslim identity that was now to follow the Caliphate and the Holy Law into oblivion.

Reform of the alphabet was not a new topic. There had been proposals for an improvement of the Arabic script since the time of the *Tanzimat*, though nothing very much had come of them. The more radical idea of abandoning the Arabic script entirely and replacing it by the Latin alphabet was put forward and discussed in Turkey in 1923 and 1924, but was decisively rejected.

By 1927, however, the situation had changed. The Kemalist régime was now firmly in the saddle, and in possession of virtually dictatorial powers; the religious opposition was cowed and disheartened by a series of crushing blows. A new factor of some importance was the decision of the Soviet authorities to adopt the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic for the Turkic

languages of the USSR, thus providing both an example and an incentive to the government of the Turkish Republic.

Already in March 1926, immediately after the Soviet decision, the Minister of Education Necati had spoken of the political significance of romanisation. Preparations went on during 1927, but nothing was heard in public until January 1928, when the first ranging shots of the preliminary barrage were fired. On 8 January the Minister of Justice, Mahmud Esad, a radical reformer who had played a major role in the repeal of the Holy Law, made a speech in which he praised the merits of the Latin script. A fortnight later the former Education Minister Hamdullah Subhi went further; 'The adoption of the Latin letters', he said, 'is for us a necessity. The old literature is doomed to moulder away.' On 24 May the first legislative step was taken – the adoption, by law, of the 'international' numerals in place of the Arabic figures which Turkey had previously shared with other Muslim countries. On 26 June a special commission met at the Dolmabahçe palace in Istanbul, with the task of 'examining the possibility and the manner of adopting the Latin letters'. Kemal, in Istanbul for the summer, personally led and directed the discussions, and was no doubt responsible for the quick and expeditious way in which the commission conducted its business.

In six weeks the new alphabet was completed, and Kemal was ready to present it to the nation. On 9 August 1928 the sometime Gazi Paşa, now President of the Republic, appeared in a new role – that of schoolmaster. The Republican People's Party was holding a fête that night, in the park at Seraglio Point, and many of its leading figures were present. Towards eleven o'clock the President himself appeared, and after a while he rose to address them.

'My friends [he said], our rich and harmonious language will now be able to display itself with new Turkish letters. We must free ourselves from these incomprehensible signs, that for centuries have held our minds in an iron vice. You must learn the new Turkish letters quickly. Teach them to your compatriots, to women and to men, to porters and to boatmen. Regard it as a patriotic and national duty ...and when you perform that duty, bear in mind that for a nation to consist of 10 or 20 per cent. of literates and 80 or 90 per cent. of illiterates is shameful. ...The fault is not ours; it is of those who failed to understand the character of the Turk and bound his mind in chains. Now is the time to eradicate the errors of the past. We shall repair these errors, and in doing so I want the participation of all our compatriots Our nation will show, with its script and with its mind, that its place is with the civilized world.'

After this call to mobilization, the Gazi set out on a tour of the country, teaching and examining the populace in village squares, schoolrooms, town halls, and cafés. The Prime Minister and other dignitaries followed his example, and soon all Turkey was a schoolroom, with the nation's intellectuals, armed with blackboard and easel, teaching the people to read and write the new script. On 1 November 1928 the Assembly, on the first day of its new session, resolved to present the new alphabet to Mustafa Kemal on a golden tablet; on 3 November they passed a law establishing the new Turkish script and prohibiting the public use of the Arabic alphabet for the Turkish language after the end of the year. A few days later examinations were held to test the literacy of civil servants in the new script, and on 11 November a cabinet decision laid down the regulations of the 'School of the Nation'. Articles 3 and 4 read: 'Every male and female

Turkish citizen is a member of this organization'; 'The chief instructor of the School of the Nation is His Excellency the President of the Republic, Gazi Mustafa Kemal.'

Various arguments have been put forward to explain and justify the revolution in the alphabet. The Arabic letters were ill suited to express the sounds of the Turkish language; they were difficult to teach and troublesome to print, and thus constituted a barrier to education and cultural expansion. These charges are not without foundation, and it is certain that the new script, clear, simple, and phonetic, showed the way to a great increase in literacy and a vast expansion of publications. But the basic purpose of the change was not so much practical and pedagogical, as social and cultural – and Mustafa Kemal, in forcing his people to accept it, was slamming a door on the past as well as opening a door to the future. The way was now clear to the final break with the past and with the East – to the final incorporation of Turkey into the civilization of the modern West. This desire, with the danger inherent in it, is well expressed by the distinguished Turkish writer Mme Halide Edib Adivar:

‘We can conceive of modern civilization as an entity. That is to say, we cannot put on Western civilization as a whole the label English, or French, or Italian. Therefore, even a nation that is a late-comer to this civilization is not simply their follower, but is also part of Western civilization. Total and slavish imitation of a model is the very opposite of the spirit of Western civilization. This point needs special attention from late-comers to this civilization.’

Experiment with Democracy

The law authorizing emergency powers was renewed in 1927 for a further period of two years. On 4 March 1929 it was allowed to run out, and the government announced that it would not be extended. At first there was no response to this relaxation of administrative control. Then, in December 1929, a new newspaper, *Yarın* (Tomorrow), began to appear and attracted attention by its criticisms of the government. As in 1924, the attack was not leveled against Kemal but against the Prime Minister Ismet and especially against his economic policies. In April the paper was suppressed for one day, and on 17 May its editor, Arif Oruç, was sentenced to a month's imprisonment on a charge of writing provocative articles. Before long he was back at work, and continued his criticisms of the government and of individual government officials.

This mild reaction presaged a second experiment with a tolerated opposition. The first hint came from Mustafa Kemal himself, who mentioned at a ball in Yalova that a new party was about to be formed. On 9 August 1930 Fethi, back in Turkey from his embassy in Paris, wrote a letter to Mustafa Kemal complaining of the failure of the government's fiscal and economic policies, of the lack of free criticism in the Assembly, and of the resulting irresponsibility of the cabinet. What was needed, he said, was an opposition, and he therefore requested the President's views on his proposal to found a new party. Kemal replied reaffirming his belief in freedom of discussion, and expressing his gratification at Fethi's acceptance of the basic principles of the secular Republic. The letter and reply were duly published, and on 12 August Fethi submitted the constitution of the Free Republican Party to the acting Vali of Istanbul with the request that it be

registered in accordance with the law of associations. The programme included greater freedom, lower taxes, better and less government.

The short and unhappy life of the Free Republican Party remains an obscure episode in the history of the Turkish Republic, and has given rise to many different explanations. Some believe that Mustafa Kemal really wished to create a multi-party democracy in Turkey, and abandoned the attempt only when reactionary violence proved that it was premature. Others have said that he aimed only at a tame, manageable opposition to release tension during a time of economic crisis, and crushed it when it seemed to be getting out of hand. Others again have interpreted the episode as a disagreement between Kemal and Ismet, the former seeking a counterweight to Ismet and the People's Party, the latter finally convincing him that the experiment was too dangerous. Certainly the Free Republican Party, founded by the authority of Mustafa Kemal and operating under his close supervision, was far less independent than the Progressive Party of 1924, and looked even less like a serious alternative to the party in power.

Whatever the truth of the matter, it soon became clear that the experiment was both premature and dangerous. Fethi and Ismet were careful to maintain the fullest courtesy and friendliness towards one another, but the appearance of a licensed opposition provoked an explosion of accumulated hatreds and resentments from many different quarters. Fethi's speeches were followed by riots and disturbances, and there were ominous stirrings in the eastern provinces. Finally, in November, the Gazi's loyal opposition was disbanded. On 15 November Fethi accused the government, in the Assembly, of electoral malpractices, and shortly afterwards announced his decision to dissolve the Free Republican Party 'because struggle against the Gazi was impossible'. This decision was made known to the Ministry of the Interior in a letter of 17 November 1930. Two other minor parties that had appeared at about the same time, the Popular Republican Party and the minute Workers' and Peasants' Party, were dissolved by direct government order.

Economic Development

In October 1929 the crash on the New York Stock Exchange ushered in the great depression, which swiftly spread across the world, bringing trade stagnation and falling prices, unemployment and ruin. Turkey, though still very imperfectly assimilated into the Western world of capitalist free enterprise, was badly hit by the fall in the prices of agricultural produce, on which she depended very largely for her export trade. Substantially self-sufficient in foodstuffs, she was able to feed her own people and shield them from the most terrible consequences of the depression. But her economic position in other respects was very vulnerable. The economic clauses in the treaty of Lausanne had restricted her power to impose certain tariffs, and had left her with a backward and undeveloped industry and a dangerously unfavourable balance of trade. For many vital supplies she was dependent on imports from the more advanced industrial countries, for which she paid with exports of raw materials. With the fall in prices, the Turkish leaders were soon faced with a grave economic crisis, caused by events beyond their reach or control, but demanding from them immediate remedial action.

The first measures taken by the Turkish government – as by most other governments affected by the crisis – were orthodox and restrictive, palliative rather than remedial in their

effects, and intended to reduce the volume of foreign trade and to cut down government expenditure. Already in June 1929, following the expiration of the restrictions imposed by the Lausanne treaty, the Assembly had approved a new tariff law; it was intended to give necessary protection to the nascent Turkish industries which the Kemalist régime had been trying almost since its inception, but without much success, to foster. The new tariff came into force on 1 October 1929, just before the beginning of the depression, and the emphasis of Turkish fiscal policy was inevitably shifted from the original objective of fostering industry to the immediate need for restriction and protection. On 4 December restrictions were imposed on currency dealings and purchases abroad, and the rate of the Turkish pound dropped to TL 11.10 to the pound sterling.

These, and other measures that followed, transformed the balance of trade in Turkey's favour, and gave some measure of protection to local products; in time they placed the whole foreign trade of the country under government control. The Turkish leaders were, however, well aware that these restrictions, though helpful in their immediate effects did nothing to bring about what the country most needed – an economic expansion that would develop her resources, endow her with industry, raise the standard of living of the people, and make her less vulnerable to the vagaries of international trade. But how was such an expansion to be accomplished?

The depression of 1929, and the hardships that resulted from it, brought a revival of anti-Western and anti-capitalist feeling. Once again, as in the early days of the struggle for independence, it seemed to many Turks that capitalism and imperialism – the two were more or less identified – were the real enemies, that it was West, at once greedy and inefficient, that was enslaving the backward nations, by preserving and exploiting their backwardness. The Ottoman Debt, the Lausanne restrictions, the trade deficit – and now a terrible crisis which the fumbling and stricken West seemed utterly unable to control or remedy and in which the Turks, innocent bystanders, had become painfully involved.

Capital and initiative were urgently needed for development who could provide them? After the struggle to end foreign control and interference, the new republican régime did not look kindly on foreign capital, nor for that matter did foreign investors show any great desire to put money into Turkey. Local capitalist enterprise was lacking in both capital and enterprise, and such people as still possessed wealth after the long years of war, occupation, and revolution were reluctant to venture it in undertakings of a new and unfamiliar kind. The government for their part did little to encourage local private enterprise. A régime of soldiers and officials, they had retained much of the traditional contempt for trade and traders, all the more so since the commercial class in the large towns still consisted very largely of Christians and Jews.

The West had failed; it was inevitable that many eyes should turn to another part of the world, where a rival, totally different system of economic organization was being tried. Soviet Russia, with all her difficulties, had been little affected by the crisis of capitalism. Her state-directed, state-operated economy seemed immune to the depression, and even the governments of the capitalist West, in apparent defiance of their own principles, were trying to solve the crisis by increasing state intervention in economic matters. Turkey was soon to follow – and surpass – their example.

Russian Influences

The suggestion has often been made that the introduction of the Turkish policy of etatism was inspired by the example and precept of the Soviet Union. Certainly, there were points of resemblance, and even of direct contact. Since the early days of the Kemalist movement, when the two outlaw, revolutionary régimes were drawn together by 'the common struggle which both peoples have undertaken against the intervention of imperialism', relations between the Turkish and Soviet Republics had been friendly. After a temporary chill during the Lausanne period, they grew warmer in 1924-5, when a clash with Britain over the Mosul question again inclined Turkish sentiments away from the West and towards the Soviets, and led to the signature of a Russo-Turkish treaty of friendship on 17 December 1925. This diplomatic friendship brought no ideological influences. Kemal had made it clear from the start that, whatever might be the arguments for Communism in Russia, he had no use for it in Turkey. On more than one occasion he specifically disavowed any affinity between Kemalist and Communist ideologies, and as early as January 1921 took steps to counter Communist activities in Turkey. In 1922 Rauf's government banned Communist propaganda; in 1925 the last semi-legal vestiges of the Turkish Communist Party were finally outlawed. In Russia, these affronts to the Communist cause were swallowed for political reasons, and the ideologists of the Comintern were busy explaining that Kemal, though anti-Communist, could be regarded as progressive, and even revolutionary, since he was destroying the remnants of feudalism, pursuing liberal agrarian policies, initiating industrial development, and resisting the encroachments of the capitalist West.

In 1928-9, in the course of a general ideological reorientation in Moscow, a new line of interpretation was adopted, and Kemal was abruptly transformed from a revolutionary hero to a reactionary tyrant.

'Kemalism had ceased to be a mass movement, and was on the way to total capitulation. It had destroyed some, but by no means all, of the feudal vestiges in the Turkish villages, and its social basis was an alliance between the top layers of the bourgeoisie and the big land-owners, plus the 'kulaks'. Kemal was said to rule by means of a unique mixture of terror and social demagoguery, a special Turkish brand of 'national fascism' or 'agrarian Bonapartism'.

Kemal was a fascist; under his rule Turkey was falling back into Imperialist domination and social reaction. These changes inevitably affected relations between the two governments. The Russian reassessment of the Kemalist regime led to a renewal of Turkish Communist activity against it, which in turn led to new and more forceful repressive measures by the Turkish authorities. In the summer of 1929 these were reported in the Soviet press, which condemned, in strong language, the actions of the Turkish government and its economic policies. The Turkish press replied defending them, and drawing the attention of the Russians to some of their own shortcomings. When the newspapers on both sides are government organs, press polemics easily become international disputes.

In these circumstances, it is the more remarkable that there should have been such a dramatic improvement in Turco-Russian relations a few months later. The first sign came in November 1929, when a commercial agreement with the USSR was initialed. On 11 December a company for trade with the USSR, founded by the Agricultural Bank and the Bank of Industry

and Mines, began work. On 13 December the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Karakhan, arrived in Ankara, where he was received by Mustafa Kemal, and on 17 December a 'Russo-Turkish Protocol' was signed, renewing the agreement of 1925. Relations became still closer in September 1930, when the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu [Aras] went on a visit to Moscow. This was followed by other visits – Litvinov in Ankara in October 1931, İsmet Paşa in Moscow in April-May 1932, Voroshilov in Ankara in October 1933, Celâl Bayar in Moscow in July 1935. The most important of these visits was that of the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Moscow in 1932, where on 8 May they signed an agreement with the USSR for a loan of \$8 million. Most of it was used for the development of the textile industry, through the Soviet-guided *kombinat* at Kayseri.

At a time when the West was still in the grip of the depression, the Soviets were thus able to offer a method of economic expansion, capital to initiate it, and experts to assist in its application. The Kemalist adoption of etatism was not due to any political or ideological leanings to the Soviet Union or to Communism, but to the sheer practical necessities of the moment. The country, still not fully recovered from the ruin and impoverishment brought by earlier struggles and upheavals, was now again stricken by the consequences of a world-wide crisis in which the Turkish leaders had neither responsibility nor control help was urgently needed; it must be taken where it could be found.

Etatism

The first hint of the new economic policy came in a speech of İsmet Paşa at Sivas in 1930, when he stressed the need for greater economic activity by the state. Then, on 20 April 1931, Mustafa Kemal published his famous manifesto, in which he set forth, for the first time, the six 'fundamental and unchanging principles' which were adopted the following month by a general conference of the Republican People's Party, and later incorporated in the constitution. They are still represented by the six arrows of the party crest. 'The Republican's People's Party', says the first article of the manifesto, 'is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secularist, and revolutionary.'

Of these principles, only one was new – that of *devletçilik*, usually translated etatism. It was defined in the third article of the manifesto in these words:

‘Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible.’

Further definitions of etatism were given, in the following years, by the party, the government, and Kemal himself. The spokesmen of etatism were at some pains to point out that they were not socialists. They had no intention of collectivizing the economy or establishing state monopolies; they would not touch agriculture at all, and had no desire to eliminate private enterprise from industry and commerce. Their purpose was to initiate and develop projects in fields which were of vital concern to the strength and well-being of the nation, and in which private capital was incapable, inactive, or dilatory.

In 1933 the first Turkish five-year plan was prepared, for the expansion of Turkish industry; it was approved on 9 January 1934, and completed in 1939. This plan was no doubt inspired by the Russian precedent, and was certainly helped by the Russian loan and Russian advice. Its aim was the simultaneous development of consumer industries, chiefly textiles, and also paper, glass and ceramics, and of the basic industrial potential, especially iron, steel, and chemicals. The most important achievements were the Soviet-planned textile factory (the *kombinat*) at Kayseri, with 33,000 spindles, and the British-constructed iron and steel works at Karabük.

As the five-year plan developed, the Turkish economic planners, though still reaffirming their respect for private enterprise, showed little interest in its expansion or even survival. Once again, the reasons were not doctrinal.

The system of etatism applied in Turkey [said Mustafa Kemal at the Izmir Fair in August 1935], is not a system copied and translated from the ideas that socialist theoreticians have been putting forward since the 19th century; our etatism takes as its basis the private initiative and personal aptitudes of individuals, but at the same time, taking account of all the needs of a great nation and a broad land, and of the fact that so much still remains to be done, it rests on the principle that the state must take charge of the national economy.

Economists have on the whole been severe in their judgment of the economic achievements of Turkish etatism. Undoubtedly, it endowed the country with many new industrial enterprises. There were factories for textiles at Kayseri, Ereğli, Nazilli, Malatya, and Bursa; paper and cellulose at Izmir, artificial silk at Gemlik, glass and bottles at Paşabahçe, china-ware at Kütahya, sulphur at Keçiözümlü, cement at Sivas. In heavy industry there were the great anthracite works at Zonguldak, and the iron and steel works at Karabük. But the efforts of the Turkish planners – and of their foreign advisers – were all too often inept, confused, and misdirected, and there are many tales of wasteful and inefficient factories, producing shoddy products at high prices.

‘What we see in Turkey [says the Thornburg report] looks, not like a planned economy, but like a poorly managed capitalist economy in which most of the capital happens to be supplied by the government. ... The result [of Russian influence] is a hybrid which does not embody the best potentialities of either of its parents.’

The Thornburg report accuses the etatist planners not only of botching their own work, but also of preventing the expansion of private enterprise which might otherwise have taken place. ‘Private enterprise did not fail; it was deliberately discouraged.’ The report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on the other hand, concedes that ‘under etatism Turkey has made substantial progress. It is doubtful whether accomplishment would have taken place in this period under domestic private enterprise with the handicap of the Ottoman heritage.’

Perhaps the most serious defect of the whole operation was the almost complete neglect of agriculture. ‘Consequently’, says Hershlag, ‘the greatest natural asset of the country remained

unexploited, agricultural production did not increase and only a limited labour force was released for urban industries.'

The Last Years

During the 1930's the government of the Republic was mainly concerned with economic matters and, later, with the looming menace of Axis aggression. Mustafa Kemal did, however, find time for a few further measures of Westernization and reform. A second experiment, in 1930, with Western-style democratic government had been abandoned after a short time, and the attempt was not renewed until 1945.' But other forms of Westernization continued. In December 1934 women were given the right to vote in parliamentary elections and to be elected as deputies, and in the election of 1935 seventeen women were elected.

The same year 1935 brought two other notable innovations. The first was the compulsory adoption, by all Turks, of surnames; the second was the introduction, in all government and public offices, of a weekly holiday from 1 p.m. Saturday until Monday morning.

Both these measures involved radical departures from Islamic custom, albeit minor in comparison with those already accomplished. The weekly day of rest is a Jewish and Christian, but not a Muslim custom; the Muslim Friday is a day of public worship, but not a Sabbath, and traditionally it was the day of greatest activity in the markets centred round the mosque. There was some movement towards a weekly day of rest in Ottoman times, but it remained informal. A legally recognized weekly day of rest, on Friday, was first introduced by the Assembly for railway workers in 1920, and in 1924 was made general for all towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The transfer of the weekly day of rest from the Muslim Friday to the Christian Sunday had obvious economic and administrative advantages, and followed logically on the adoption of the Western clock and the Western calendar.

The Turks, like most other Muslim peoples, were not in the habit of using family names. A man would be known by his personal name, given at birth, supplemented by a second name given in childhood, or by his father's name. Surnames existed, but were rare, and not in common usage. The more complex and extensive relationships of a modern society made a system of family names desirable; the adoption of the new civil code made it immediately necessary. A law of 28 June 1934 imposed on every Turkish citizen the obligation to adopt a surname with effect from 1 January 1935. At the same time all non-military ranks and titles surviving from the old regime were abolished, and replaced by the new words *Bay* and *Bayan* – Mr. and Mrs. The Prime Minister was given, by the President, the name of the place where he had won a victory, and became İsmet İnönü. The President renounced his titles and received from the Assembly the name Atatürk – father-Turk. At the same time he dropped the excessively Arabic 'Mustafa' thus becoming Kemal Atatürk, the name by which he was known for the rest of his life, and after.

In the early months of 1938, during a journey in Anatolia, Kemal Atatürk was taken ill. After a brief recovery his condition worsened rapidly, and on 5 September he thought it advisable to make his will. On 1 November, when the new session of the Assembly opened its proceedings, the President's message was, for the first time, read for him by the Prime Minister, and on 10 November a stunned and anguished nation learned that the great leader who had

guided it for nearly twenty years was dead. 'The Turkish fatherland', said the government communiqué, 'has lost its great builder, the Turkish nation its mighty leader, mankind a great son. On 16 November his coffin, on a catafalque draped with the Turkish flag, was placed in the great reception hall of the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, where for three days and nights an endless stream of mourners passed to pay their last respects. On the 19th Professor Serefeddin Yaltkaya, a distinguished Islamic scholar and theologian, recited the Muslim funeral prayers over his body, and twelve generals carried the catafalque to a gun-carriage waiting outside the Palace. A mighty funeral cortège followed it to the Gülhane park, where the coffin was placed on board a torpedo boat and then transferred to the battleship *Yavuz*, the former *Göben*. From there it was landed at Izmit and taken by a special train to Ankara, where it was consigned, with full military honours, to a temporary tomb in the Ethnographical Museum. In 1953 it was transferred to its final resting place in the newly completed mausoleum at Rasat Tepe, on the outskirts of the capital.

Kemal Atatürk was a man of swift and decisive action, of sudden and often violent decision. A tough and brilliant soldier, a hard drinker and wench, he was in all things a man of immense will and abounding vitality. By his contemporaries he was often called a dictator, and in a sense he certainly was. But in saying this one must remember that his rule was very different from that of other men, in Europe and the Middle East yesterday and today, to whom the same term is applied. An autocrat by personal and professional bias, dominating and imperious by temperament, he yet showed a respect for decency and legality, for human and political standards, that is in astonishing contrast with the behaviour of lesser and more pretentious men. His was a dictatorship without the uneasy over-the-shoulder glance, the terror of the door-bell, the dark menace of the concentration camp. Force and repression were certainly used to establish and maintain the Republic during the period of revolutionary changes, but no longer; and after the executions of 1926 there was little danger to life and to personal liberty. Political activity against the régime was banned and newspapers were under strict control. But apart from this, talk, and even books and periodicals, were comparatively free. Critics of the regime from the humbler classes were left alone; critics among the ruling *élite* were, in accordance with earlier Ottoman practice, punished with governorships or embassies in remote places. Violence was rare, and was usually in response to violent opposition.

The subsequent rise of military régimes in other Muslim countries in the Middle East has led some observers to see in Atatürk and his Revolution the prototype of these later movements. There is, however, very little resemblance between them. Atatürk was not a revolutionary junior officer seizing power by coup d'état, but a general and a pasha, taking control by gradual, almost reluctant steps in a moment of profound national crisis. He and his associates, though imbued with new ideas, were by status and habit men of the old Ottoman ruling *élite*, with centuries of military and Imperial experience. Even after the destruction of the Empire and the banishment of the dynasty, they still had the assurance and authority to demand – and receive – obedience, not needing either to court popularity or enforce submission. And so they were able to carry through their Revolution by a kind of paternalistic guidance, without resort to the whole monstrous apparatus of demagogy and repression familiar in the European dictatorships and their imitations elsewhere.

It was as a soldier that Atatürk first rose to lead his people – as the brilliant and inspired leader who snatched the Sick Man of Europe from his death-bed and infused him with a new life and vitality. His first great achievements were in the heroic mode – in fashioning an army, a movement, and a nation from the débris of the shattered Empire and driving the invaders from the national soil. Yet it is not in these achievements, great as they were, that the true greatness of Atatürk lies. Rather does it lie in his realization that all this was enough – and yet not enough; that the military task was completed, and another, very different one remained. In 1923, at the moment of his triumph, there were many opportunities which might have tempted a military commander to seek more glory, or a nationalist leader to arouse new passions. He renounced them all, and with a realism, restraint, and moderation unusual among heroes, warned his people against all such heady adventures. The next task was at home – for when all the invaders, military, financial, political, had gone, there still remained the problem of rebuilding the country, already backward, now further weakened by long years of war and internal struggle. It is the supreme merit of Kemal Atatürk that he – the Ottoman soldier, the victorious hero, was able to see this, and to make the immense effort of imagination and courage that it required of him. In a society that despised labour and trade, where ingenuity was an infidel trick and the military virtues the only universally accepted standard, the Gazi Pasha became a civilian President, and setting aside his uniform, appeared to his people in a top hat and evening dress. With this new image of himself Kemal Atatürk, the master of social symbolism, made it clear to his people that, for the time being, the age of martial valour in holy war had ended; the time had come for the solid, bourgeois virtues of industry, skill, and thrift, needed in the hard, unglamorous, but urgent task of developing the country and raising the standard of living of her people. In his political ideas Kemal Atatürk was an heir to the Young Turks – more especially of the nationalist, positivist, and Westernizing wing among them. The two dominant beliefs of his life were in the Turkish nation and in progress; the future of both lay in civilization, which for him meant the modern civilization of the West, and no other. His nationalism was healthy and reasonable; there was no arrogant trampling on the rights or aspirations of other nations, no neurotic rejection of responsibility for the national past. The Turks were a great people of great achievement, who had gone astray through the evil effects of certain elements and forces among them; they must be restored to the path of progress, to find their place in the community of civilized nations. 'The Turks', he said in 1924, 'are the friends of all civilized nations. Countries vary, but civilization is one, and for a nation to progress it must take part in this single civilization.'

Unlike so many reformers, Kemal Atatürk was well aware that a mere facade of modernization was worthless, and that if Turkey was to hold her own in the world of our time, fundamental changes were necessary in the whole structure of society and culture. Opinions are divided on the success and on the wisdom of some of his policies. If on the one hand there were complaints that the reforms were limited in their application to the towns and urban classes, and brought little change to the peasant mass of the population, on the other hand there were many who felt that the reforms were too violent and abrupt, and caused a rupture with the religious and cultural traditions of the nation that was harmful in its effects on the younger generation.

Whatever views one may hold on these points, this much is indisputable – that, at the darkest moment in their history, the Kemalist Revolution brought new life and hope to the Turkish people, restored their energies and self-respect, and set them firmly on the road not only to independence, but to that rarer and more precious thing that is freedom.